This article explores how immigration into the United Kingdom from the European Union became a negatively perceived "issue" in British public discourse and how the politicisation of EU immigration unfolded under the first Cameron (coalition) government, with special attention to the rhetoric of Prime Minister (PM) David Cameron. The paper assesses the role the PM's political language and decisions played in constructing a negative image of EU immigrants in the above mentioned period. It does so by examining his speeches through Critical Discourse Analysis and defining the extent to which he politicised the phenomenon, as set out by the Copenhagen School's theory of Securitisation. The paper consequently finds that between 2010 and 2015 Cameron's political language adapted to the political pressures felt both within and outside his party, which as a result steered his rhetoric on EU immigration towards a growingly hostile and alienating direction. This was expressed through a political language that used overwhelmingly one-sided arguments, put more emphasis on the negative side of EU immigration, and often clearly differentiated between the "good" in-group (British citizens) and the "bad" out-group (EU immigrants). However, while the PM's rhetoric largely contributed to the politicisation of the issue, it had no clearly identifiable securitising intent.
Introduction
phenomena by highlighting that immigration was often felt as an "issue" in areas of the UK least affected by immigration, and among right-wing media consumers. 4 Speech acts serve the aim to "convince a specific audience of the existential nature of the threat" (Collins, 2007: 113) and therefore use arguments of "priority and urgency" and a "necessity to break the rules" (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) . 5 See Lynch and Whitaker (2012: 287) and Duffy (2014) for accounts of the voter defection.
To evaluate the Prime Minister's impact on public discourse and establish his role in the top-down securitisation of EU immigration, however, this paper looks at his rhetoric between May 2010 and May 2015 based on official government announcements, international and party conferences and interviews. Two main periods are identified: a non-politicised period and a politicised period. The former discusses processes that led to the PM's politicisation of the subject in March 2013, while the latter offers analysis of the PM's speeches which contributed to the construction of the predominant perception of EU immigrants. Although this section points out the presence of elements of securitisation, there was in fact no securitising intent from the PM, and a distinct "securitisation stage" thus cannot be established.
Non-politicised period (May 2010 to March 2013)
The Prime Minister dedicated much attention to both the issues of European integration and economic migration in his speeches leading up to 2013. However, he only ever referred to non-EU immigration, signalling a clear intent not to politicise EU immigration (Cameron, 2010; Queen's Speech, 2010) . According to Partos and Bale (2015: 171) this strategy was a way of "decontaminating the toxic Conservative brand after two terms of populist rhetoric from previous leaders" concerning immigration. Nevertheless, due to bottom-up forces, EU immigration was a somewhat politicised topic even in this period.
One has to look no further than the Daily Mail's front pages from 2011 to find examples of headlines such as "One in a hundred Slovakians has come to live in Britain", "Poles are sending home £3bn a year…and we pay them £4.5m a week in benefits" and "Along with hard-working Polish plumbers we have countless criminals from former Iron Curtain countries" (Daily Mail, 2011a , 2011b , 2011c .
A speech from April 2011, dedicated solely to the topic of non-EU immigration, illustrates well that the PM deliberately downplayed the importance of EU immigration at this time (Cameron, 2011) . His strategy was met by heavy criticism from Nigel Farage, who pointed out that "We cannot control migration into Britain if we're part of the European Union and that's a debate Mr Cameron does not want to have" (Farage, 2011) . In January 2013, the PM's "Bloomberg speech" (Cameron, 2013a) -promising a referendum on EU membership if re-elected in 2015 -came amid growing Eurosceptic pressures and was aimed to appease Tory backbenchers as well as to regain "strategic" UKIP supporters.
6 On the contrary, however, it resulted in more protest from Eurosceptic Tory MPs (Rigby and Parker, 2014 ) and a surge in voting intention for UKIP [from 10%
in January 2013 -when the Bloomberg speech was made -to 16% by June 2013] (UK Polling Report, 2016).
Having promised a referendum, yet still aiming to uphold positive public opinion on EU immigrants, Cameron was confronted with a limited room for manoeuvre in which his rhetoric gradually grew more hostile to immigration in general.
Politicised period (March 2013 to May 2015)
Cameron addressed EU immigration as an "issue" for the first time in a major speech in March 2013 (Cameron, 2013b), advocating for the need for reforms to make the welfare and housing systems "fit the immigration policy" and deter "unwanted" immigrantswith a sudden focus on EU immigrants.
In the speech, the emphasis was put on the potential abusers of the system, without significant acknowledgement of those who did come for the "right reasons:" those who came to "contribute", those who were "fair" ("You put into Britain, you don't just take out" 7 ), or the "brightest and the best". In fact students (who made up almost a quarter of all EEA [European Economic Area] immigrants at the time of the speech) were not even mentioned. On the other hand, continuous references to "British taxpayers" created a harsh "us" (in-group) versus "them" (out-group) distinction, with the PM saying "Right now the message through the benefit system is all wrong. It says that if you can't find a job or you drop out of work early, the British taxpayer owes you a living for as long as you like (…). So, yes, of course [EEA migrants] can still come and stay here if they want to, but the British taxpayer will not go endlessly paying for them anymore." 6 Ford et. al (2012) define "strategic" UKIP supporters as those who are prone to vote UKIP at European Parliament elections, but not necessarily at national elections -unlike "core" supporters.
7 On the contrary, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) found that EEA immigrants contributed more to the British economy in the form of taxes than they "took out" from the system in the form of benefits and social housing .
Thus, on one hand, Cameron portrayed himself ready to campaign to leave the EU if British concerns "fell on deaf ears" in the EU, while on the other hand he highlighted the benefits of free movement to Britain in order to increase negotiating potential.
Although the PM did occasionally mention EU immigration in interviews and debates after November 2014, he refrained from further politicisation in order to divert public attention from his failed promise to reduce net migration "to the tens of thousands" and instead presented his achievements, such as creating jobs and helping small businesses.
This strategy seemed successful, as his popularity increased in the following months, culminating in the highest voter approval rating (at 41%, in February 2015) that the PM had reached since entering office (Boffey, 2015) .
In the run-up to the 2015 General Election party leaders were invited to various television debates and interviews, in which EU immigration was a recurring element.
What was evident from his rhetoric during the debates on these occasions was that the PM did not want to politicise EU immigration any further. Instead, he deflected questions on immigration by answering them with reference to the potential success of his economic policies, and handled questions about immigrants' access to benefits by pointing to British people getting off those benefits (Cameron, 2015a) . His efforts were most obvious when on 2 April 2015 in an ITV debate with leaders of the seven largest parties (including UKIP), Cameron exercised caution and did not react to Farage's comments on EU immigration in a way that would have sparked a debate (Cameron, 2015b) . Furthermore, on 30 April in a BBC Question Time Special, he especially tried to avoid a securitising language, saying that "everyone who lives in our country" (not "British taxpayers") had the right for "economic security" if they "worked hard" and "did the right thing."
On 8 May 2015 the Conservatives won the General Election and Cameron formed a majority government, with the emphasis on the economy indeed proving to be one of the main reasons for this victory (Swinford, 2015) . EU immigration was not further politicised after the election. It was not addressed in Cameron's victory speech (Cameron, 2015c) , and the Queen's Speech (2015) did not mention "welfare reform" and "capping benefits" on the same page as "controlling immigration" either.
Conclusion
Having analysed Cameron's effect on the EU immigration discourse in the years of his first premiership it can be seen that by 
